THE TRUTH BE TOLD DON'T USE A VOTING MACHINE

Rigged USA Elections Exposed
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Rigged USA Elections Exposed
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THE TRUTH BE TOLD

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Any group of Americans opposed to Barack Hussein Obama could be considered a "conspiracy" (This is more evidence why I indicate we are no longer a nation of laws.)

24 lines of code can flip an election

Black Box Voting Report on Diebold Voting Machine Test

Who's Counting: Hacking Diebold Voting Machines

This link is an incomplete sample of the problems with voting in America, with particular emphasis on the fallacies and disasters of electronic voting

The Diebold Bombshell by David Dill, Doug Jones, and Barbara Simons

Chapter 3 — Direct Recording Electronic Voting (Take Time To Read This.)

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Request An Absentee Ballot. Don't Use A Voting Machine.

Absentee Paper Ballots

Even An Absentee Paper Ballot Can Have A Problem If Not Marked In Black Ink Etc But Its Still Better

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(This is why the congress is no longer listening nor following the rules of the US Constitution. This is why we are not longer a nation of laws. This is why I believe there will be civil war in a limited way. 24 lines of code. 24 lines of code can change your vote. This is what I believe elected the imposter obama. It would only have taken a few hundred of these machines to tip the balance in a few key states. Read the article by the programmer and you will see that the code can be changed and it can't be detected that it was changed. This is why I say were are not longer a nation of laws. We have no way to verify our votes unless there is a paper trail. In electronic voting voters have no paper trail and 24 lines of code can change the recorded vote and it can't be detected by ANYONE!) Story Reports

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Lets not be naive about electronic voting.
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This article presents the findings of three of the leading experts on electronic voting equipment.

July 24, 2006 — Most computer scientists have long viewed Diebold as the poster child for all that is wrong with touch screen voting machines. But we never imagined that Diebold would be as irresponsible and incompetent as they have turned out to be.

Recently, computer security expert Harri Hursti revealed serious security vulnerabilities in Diebold's software. According to Michael Shamos, a computer scientist and voting system examiner in Pennsylvania, "It's the most severe security flaw ever discovered in a voting system."

Even more shockingly, we learned recently that Diebold and the State of Maryland had been aware of these vulnerabilities for at least two years. They were documented in analysis, commissioned by Maryland and conducted by RABA Technologies, published in January 2004. For over two years, Diebold has chosen not to fix the security holes, and Maryland has chosen not to alert other states or national officials about these problems.

Basically, Diebold included a "back door" in its software, allowing anyone to change or modify the software. There are no technical safeguards in place to ensure that only authorized people can make changes.

A malicious individual with access to a voting machine could rig the software without being detected. Worse yet, if the attacker rigged the machine used to compute the totals for some precinct, he or she could alter the results of that precinct. The only fix the RABA authors suggested was to warn people that manipulating an election is against the law.

Typically, modern voting machines are delivered several days before an election and stored in people's homes or in insecure polling stations. A wide variety of poll workers, shippers, technicians, and others who have access to these voting machines could rig the software. Such software alterations could be difficult to impossible to detect.

Diebold spokesman David Bear admitted to the New York Times that the back door was inserted intentionally so that election officials would be able to update their systems easily. Bear justified Diebold's actions by saying, "For there to be a problem here, you' re basically assuming a premise where you have some evil and nefarious election officials who would sneak in and introduce a piece of software... I don't believe these evil elections people exist."

While Diebold's confidence in election officials is heartwarming, Diebold has placed election officials in an awkward position, with no defense against disgruntled candidates or voters questioning the results of an election. The situation is even worse for those states and localities using Diebold touch-screen machines that have no voter-verified paper records to recount.

Diebold voting machines have been certified to be in compliance with 2002 Voting System Standards, as required by the Help America Vote Act. These standards prohibit software features that raise any doubt "that the software tested during the qualification process remains unchanged and retains its integrity." We must ask, how did software containing such an outrageous violation come to be certified, and what other flaws, yet to be uncovered, lurk in other certified systems?

(Here I must also ask how could software that was so flawed in that it could be hacked so votes could be changed so easy be qualified by the US government? My answer kickbacks, payoffs, bribes and threats etc.) Story Reports

There have been many significant problems — some resulting in lost votes — involving paperless voting machines produced by other vendors. Recognizing the intrinsic risks of paperless voting machines, the Association for Computing Machinery issued a statement saying that each voter should be able "to inspect a physical (e.g., paper) record to verify that his or her vote has been accurately cast and to serve as an independent check on the result."

Without voter-verified paper records of all the votes, and without routine spot audits of these records, no currently available voting system can be trusted. With such records, even when machines do not function correctly, each voter can make sure that his or her vote has been correctly recorded on paper.

Our republic depends on our having secure, reliable, and accurate elections.

David L. Dill is a Professor of Computer Science at Stanford University and the founder of VerifiedVoting.org.

Douglas W. Jones is an Associate Professor of Computer Science at the University of Iowa.

Barbara Simons is retired from IBM Research and a former ACM President.
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Computer scientists reveal new voting machine hack successfully changed votes

By David Edwards and John Byrne

Published: August 12, 2009

A team of computer scientists at University of California, San Diego, the University of Michigan and Princeton University announced a new way to electronically steal votes Monday.

“We wanted to find if a real criminal could do this, starting from scratch, with no access to source code or other closely guarded technical information,” the announcer begins. “We faced several challenges: getting a voting machine, figuring out how it works, discovering a weakness, overcoming the machine’s security features and constructing attack software.”

“In the end we found that it is possible to undetectably change votes and that such an attack takes a lot less time and money than one might expect,” the announcer said.

A Princeton professor was able to acquire five voting machines for just $82 that had been resold on a government surplus website. The acquired machines were originally sold by Sequoia Voting Systems.

While the voting machines were older and had been discontinued by North Carolina, where they were originally used, the voting apparatus are still in use in Louisiana and New Jersey.

Professors and computer science graduate students found that they could switch votes use a technique called “return oriented programming.”

The students theorized that voting machines could be easily broken into by attackers the night before the election, and vote hacking software installed. The following day, machines would produce altered votes without being able to be detected.

The study was done using 16 graduate students and cost a total of $100,000 — a tiny fraction of the money spent by both parties during the 2008 presidential campaign.

Computer scientists reveal new voting machine hack successfully changed votes

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Tony Dale Investment & Retirement